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This study focuses on learning of the self, by examining how human observers update 
internal representations of their own face. For this purpose, we present a novel gaze-
contingent paradigm, in which an onscreen face either mimics observersÕ own eye-gaze 
behaviour (in the congruent condition), moves its eyes in different directions to that of 
the observers (incongruent condition), or remains static and unresponsive (neutral 
condition). Across three experiments, the mimicry of the onscreen face did not affect 
observersÕ perceptual self-representations. However, this paradigm influenced observersÕ 
reports of their own face. This effect was such that observers felt the onscreen face to be 
their own and that, if the onscreen gaze had moved on its own accord, observers 






The face is one of our most distinctive physical features. It is considered the 
signature of the self (McNeill, 1998) and plays an important role in self-awareness 
(Morin, 2006). Therefore, it is not surprising that self-face recognition has attracted 
researchersÕ attention over the past two centuries (for a review, see Keenan, Gallup, & 
Falk, 2003). Most studies in this field have focused on the retrieval of the visual 
representation of the own face (e.g., Brady, Campbell, & Flathery, 2004, 2005; Brdart, 
2003; Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Tong & Nakayama, 1999), the 
differences between the processes involved in the recognition of our own and other 
faces (e.g., Greenberg & Goshen-Gottstein, 2009), and the neural bases of self-face 
recognition (for a review, see Devue & Brdart, 2011). In this study, we want to explore 
one aspect of self-recognition that has received comparatively little attention, by 
examining how human observers might update visual representations of their own face.  
Recognition requires that a seen face is matched to a stored, internal 
representation of that identity. Theories of face processing postulate that this internal 
representation is not tied to a specific instance of a seen face, but is activated by any 
image of this person (see, e.g., Burton, Bruce, & Johnston, 1990; Bruce & Young, 
1986). Thus, this internal representation should be tolerant to some changes in the 
appearance of a face, such as variation in lighting direction (see, e.g., Bruce, 1982; 
Longmore, Liu, & Young, 2008). A question that arises is how this internal 
representation is created so that a previously unfamiliar face, of someone that we have 
not met before, becomes sufficiently familiar for recognition to occur. 
Current theorising suggests one way to operationalize this process could be the 
creation of face averages, in which different instances of the same face are integrated 
into a single representation (Burton, Jenkins, Hancock, & White, 2005). In this process, 
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information that is relevant to the identity of a person, and therefore present consistently 
across encounters, is combined to form a robust facial representation for recognition. By 
contrast, variable visual information that is irrelevant to identity, such as superficial 
changes in the appearance of a particular face, is eliminated naturally during averaging 
because their effect will be cancelled out across different instances. 
This theoretical account can provide a robust method to simulate face 
recognition (Burton, Jenkins, & Schweinberger, 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 2008; 
Robertson, Kramer, & Burton, 2015). It also provides an account of face learning (see 
e.g., Burton, Kramer, Ritchie, & Jenkins, in press; Kramer, Ritchie, & Burton, 2015; 
Leib et al., 2014). Accordingly, the created internal representation of a face is tied in an 
additive manner to the experience of that identity, whereby every new exposure 
strengthens its average and leads to a stronger internal representation (Burton et al., 
2005, 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 2008). Interestingly, this theoretical approach can also 
explain two interrelated aspects of self-recognition, namely how a visual representation 
of the own face is created and how this representation accommodates changes in 
physical appearance during the lifespan. According to this perspective, any new 
instance of the own face would be incorporated into the averaging process to naturally 
deal with changes in the appearance. 
However, current theories stop short of explaining an important component of 
self-recognition, which is the self-referential process of knowing that a particular face is, 
in fact, oneÕs own (e.g., Devue & Brdart, 2011; Morin, 2006). A potential answer to 
this question emerges from the domain of body perception, where research has shown 
the importance of body-awareness for self-recognition (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Tsakiris, 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Mental representations of our bodies are 
held to be created through the interaction and integration of different senses, such as 
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visual, tactile and proprioceptive information (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). This information appears to be used not only in the 
formation of a representation of our body, but also for updating and modifying that 
representation when necessary (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager, Tadi, 
Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; Petkova et al., 2011; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
Evidence for such accounts comes from the rubber hand illusion. In this 
paradigm, observers watch a rubber-hand being stroked while their own hand is stroked 
out of sight in synchrony. This simultaneous stimulation produces the feeling that the 
rubber hand is, in fact, oneÕs own hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005). This effect relies on the multi-sensory combination of touch (of oneÕs own hand) 
and sight (of the rubber hand being stroked). However, a rubber-hand effect has also 
been obtained without touching, for example, when there is synchrony of movement 
between a rubber and oneÕs own hand (e.g., Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 
2009; Riemer et al., 2014). Similar effects have been reported with arms (Guterstam, 
Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011) and even with the whole body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; 
Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al., 2011). 
With respect to face learning, these findings are interesting in that they could 
provide a self-referential process to update internal representations, by accommodating 
physical changes in a personÕs appearance due to, for example, cosmetics, styling or 
aging. Accordingly, such updating could be supported if observers can see and, through 
proprioceptive feedback, feel their own face move at the same time. Outside of the 
laboratory, such feedback is available daily from mirrors, for example, during hygiene 
activities such as washing and grooming. In these conditions, a personÕs mirror 
reflection provides synchronous visual feedback for motor, proprioceptive and tactile 
information (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl, & Tsakiris 2012a; 
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Tsakiris, 2008, 2010). This feedback provides direct evidence that a looked-at face is, in 
fact, oneÕs own. The question arises of whether this also contributes to the updating of a 
personÕs face, by accommodating external changes in their physical appearance into 
existing internal representations. 
Studies of multi-sensory integration already provide some evidence to support 
this idea. For example, when observersÕ faces are stroked in synchrony with a target that 
consists of a 50:50 morph of their own face and that of another person, they 
subsequently tend to see more of their own features in the other personÕs face (Tsakiris, 
2008). This perceptual effect is accompanied by a subjective illusion that the other face 
belongs to the observer. This bias in self-recognition or Òenfacement effectÓ (Sforza, 
Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010) has been shown with totally unfamiliar (Tajadura-
Jimnez et al., 2012a), familiar (Sforza et al., 2010), and other-race faces (Bufalari, 
Lenggenhager, Porciello, Serra-Holmes, & Aglioti, 2014; Fini, Cardini, Tajadura-
Jimnez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 2013). 
While these findings point to a remarkably robust effect, multi-sensory 
paradigms rely on observing the tactile stimulation of another agent. This presents a 
scenario that is not encountered outside of the laboratory. In this study, we therefore 
wish to examine whether a similar updating of observersÕ facial representations occurs 
with a stimulation method that is more similar to the experience of studying oneÕs own 
reflection in a mirror. For this purpose, we present a gaze-contingent paradigm, in 
which the eye movements of a face on a computer screen directly mimic the looking 
behaviour of an observer. 
To measure the effect of this manipulation on self-recognition, we compared 
several conditions. In Experiment 1, the gaze behaviour of the onscreen target face 
provided a direct Òmirror-reflectionÓ of observersÕ gaze behaviour, by mimicking their 
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eye movements in the congruent condition. This was contrasted with an incongruent 
condition in which the eyes of the onscreen face responded to observers eye-gaze but 
moved in a different direction. If mirror-reflection is used to update facial 
representations of the own face, then it should be possible to induce an enfacement-type 
effect in this paradigm, whereby the onscreen face should be perceived as more similar 
to the own face. In line with studies of multi-sensory stimulation (e.g., Fini et al., 2013; 
Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008), this effect should be 
found in the congruent gaze condition in comparison with incongruent displays.  
To assess this possibility, we adopted established measures of the enfacement 
illusion from multi-sensory stimulation paradigms (see, e.g., Keenan et al., 1999; 
Maister, Tsiakkas, & Tsakiris, 2013; Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). 
This comprised a self-other discrimination task, in which observers were shown a 
morphing sequence between the onscreen face viewed in the stimulation stage and 
observersÕ own face. In this task, observers were asked to determine at which point they 
could perceive their own face in the sequence. This measure was complemented with an 
enfacement questionnaire, which assessed different aspects of observersÕ 




In this experiment, observers watched an onscreen face in a gaze-contingent 
paradigm, which was comprised of two conditions. In the congruent condition, the eyes 
of this face mimicked observersÕ eye-gaze direction to imitate, in this particular aspect, 
the experience of looking in a mirror. Observers triggered the eye-gaze of the onscreen 
face by moving their own eyes, which were tracked concurrently, around the display 
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screen. To encourage such eye movements, the onscreen face was surrounded by eight 
boxes, which, upon being fixated, revealed a visual icon. Performance in this task was 
contrasted with an incongruent condition, in which the eyes of the onscreen face moved 
in temporal synchrony with an observer eye-gaze but in a different direction. 
Before and after this task, observers performed a self-other discrimination task. 
This consisted of a morphing sequence between the onscreen face from the stimulation 
stage and observersÕ own faces. This sequence always began with the onscreen face, 
which was gradually morphed into the observerÕs face. Observers had to stop this 
sequence as soon as they felt that the face resembled their own face more than that of 
the stimulation face. In addition, observersÕ phenomenological experience of the gaze-
contingent task was assessed with an established enfacement questionnaire. 
 If this gaze-contingent mirror-reflection paradigm can be used to update 
observersÕ representations of their own face, then the onscreen face should become 
integrated into this representation in the congruent condition. As a consequence, 
observers should detect their own face earlier in the morphing sequence in the 
congruent than the incongruent condition. This effect should also be evident from the 
questionnaire, with observers reporting a greater resemblance with the stimulation face 




Twenty Caucasian students (13 females) from the University of Kent, with a 
mean age of 22 years (SD = 4.2), participated in this study. All provided informed 
consent prior to taking part and received course credits or a small fee for participation. 





Gaze-contingent stimulation displays 
For the stimuli of the gaze-contingent task, a male and a female frontal face were 
taken from the Glasgow Face Database (Burton, White & McNeill, 2010). These faces 
were digitized with FaceGen Modeller software (Singular inversions Inc., Toronto). The 
resulting faces provided artificial representations of the original stimuli, in which gaze 
direction can be controlled with the same software. This was used to create nine images 
of each face, in which the eye-gaze systematically varied across three horizontal (left, 
middle, right) and three vertical positions (up, middle, down). To enhance the salience 
of these gaze directions, the brightness of the sclera was increased by 25% using Adobe 
Photoshop. 
In the experiment, each of these faces was presented at a width and height of 325 
x 420 pixels at a resolution of 72 ppi in the centre of a white display. These faces were 
surrounded by eight boxes, which measured 220 x 220 pixels. When fixated, these 
boxes were replaced by images of objects (e.g., a radio, cd, glove), which measured 
maximally 200 x 200 pixels. These displays are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Self-other discrimination task 
For the self-other discrimination task, a digital photograph of each observer was 
taken prior the experiment. For consistency with the modelÕs face, these pictures were 
also modelled with FaceGen. The resulting images were morphed with the stimulation 
face that matched the observerÕs sex in 1% steps using Fantamorph (Abrasoft) software. 
This resulted in a sequence of 100 images, which provided a smooth continuum 
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between the stimulation face and an observerÕs own face. Each of these images was 
presented at a size of 254 x 313 pixels at a resolution of 96 ppi. 
 
Enfacement questionnaire 
A questionnaire was administered to assess observersÕ subjective experience of 
the gaze-contingent paradigm. This questionnaire was adapted from studies of the 
ÒenfacementÓ effect (Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a; see also Maister et al., 2013) and 
consisted of 11 items (see Table 1). The first seven questions assessed observersÕ 
enfacement experience and included items such as ÒI felt like the onscreen face was my 
faceÓ and ÒI felt like I was looking at my own face in the mirrorÓ. A high score in these 
items indicates that observers felt that the stimulation face had become integrated with 
the internal presentation of their own face during the experiment (see Tajadura-Jimnez, 
Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 2012b). The four remaining items assessed whether 
observers perceived the eye-gaze of the stimulation face, with statements such as ÒI felt 
like the onscreen faceÕs eyes followed my eyesÓ, to provide a manipulation check. 
Responses to all items were recorded on 7-point Likert scales, which ranged from 
Òstrongly disagreeÓ to Òstrongly agreeÓ. 
 
Procedure 
In the experiment, observers participated in the self-other discrimination task 
first to obtain a baseline measure of self-recognition (the pre-test), which was conducted 
using E-prime on a computer with a 21Ó screen. In this task, observers viewed the 
sequence of the morphed faces. This sequence always began with the stimulation face 
(100% stimulation face, 0% observer), which was gradually morphed, in 1% segments, 
into an observerÕs own face. This sequence was presented at a rate of one segment per 
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second. While watching this sequence, observers were asked to press the space bar as 
soon as they felt that the displayed face resembled their own face more than that of the 
stimulation phase. Prior to this pre-test, observers were trained on this discrimination 
task by watching a sequence that morphed the face of David Cameron (British Prime 
Minister) into Barack Obama (American President). 
The pre-test was followed by the gaze-contingent stimulation task. For this task, 
observersÕ eye movements were tracked using the SR-Research Eyelink 1000 desk-
mounted eye tracking system. Observers sat at a distance of 50 cm from a 21Ó screen, 
which was held constant by a chinrest. Although viewing was binocular, only the left 
eye was tracked. To calibrate eye-gaze, the standard nine-point Eyelink procedure was 
used. Thus, observers fixated a set of nine fixations targets, which was followed by a 
second sequence of nine targets to validate calibration. If this procedure indicated poor 
measurement accuracy (i.e., a measurement error of > 1¡ of visual angle), calibration 
was repeated. 
At the beginning of the stimulation task, observers fixated a central dot so that 
an automatic drift correction could be performed. The stimulation face was then 
displayed in the centre of the screen. The sex of this face was always kept congruent 
with that of the observer. The stimulation face was surrounded by eight boxes, which 
were depicted in different colours (see Figure 1). Each of these boxes hid an object, 
which was revealed when it was fixated by the observers, to provide a task demand that 
would encourage eye movements around these displays. Observers were asked to look 
at these boxes and to memorize their contents. Crucially, the onscreen location of these 
boxes served as trigger regions to manipulate the eye-gaze direction of the stimulation 
face, which changed only 150 msec after a trigger region was fixated. This task lasted 
for two minutes and, to assess any effects of this stimulation on self-recognition, was 
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followed by a repetition of the self-other discrimination task and the enfacement 
questionnaire. Observers were then presented with a second block of the stimulation 
task, which was followed by a further repetition of the discrimination task and the 
questionnaire. 
One of the stimulation blocks comprised congruent stimulation (i.e., the gaze of 
the stimulation face was always congruent with observersÕ own eye-gaze direction) and 
the other block incongruent stimulation (i.e., the gaze of the stimulation face was 
always incongruent with observersÕ own eye-gaze direction). This spatial incongruence 
was created by randomly assigning a different gaze direction to the stimulation face for 
each of the observerÕs possible gaze directions. Over the course of the experiment, the 




Self-other discrimination task 
Performance in the discrimination task was assessed first. Figure 2 shows the 
mean percentage of frames that were perceived as the stimulation face and as observersÕ 
own face in the morphing sequence. This data is given for the initial baseline measure 
and after the gaze-congruent and incongruent stimulation conditions were administered. 
A one-factor ANOVA (baseline, congruent, incongruent condition) of this data showed 
a main effect of condition, F(1,19) = 7.13, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .27. Paired sample t-tests 
(Bonferroni-corrected) revealed that observers perceived their own face earlier in the 
morphing sequence after the application of the gaze-congruent condition in comparison 
with the baseline, t(19) = 2.80, p < .05. However, a similar effect was observed also in 
the incongruent condition in comparison to baseline, t(19) = 3.44, p < .01, and the 
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congruent and incongruent condition did not differ from each other, t(19) = 0.50, p = .98. 
Taken together, these results suggest a practice effect as observers perceived their own 
face earlier in both the congruent and incongruent condition compared with the baseline. 
However, the equivalent performance in the congruent and incongruent condition also 




We also assessed observersÕ questionnaire responses to determine if this 
paradigm affected how they felt regarding the stimulation face. These data are provided 
in Figure 3 as mean Likert responses to each of the enfacement items, for the congruent 
and incongruent conditions. Four of the questionnaire items are verification items, 
which assess whether observers were sensitive to the gaze-contingent task. The 
differences in ratings for these verification items show that observers were aware that 
the stimulation face followed their own eye-gaze in the congruent compared to the 
incongruent condition (items 8 and 9), both ts(19) ≥ 4.00, ps < .001. The ratings also 
show a clear difference between conditions in terms of the directionality of the eye-gaze 
(items 10 and 11), whereby observers were more likely to report that the eyes of the 
stimulation face moved in the same direction as their own eyes in the congruent 
condition, t(19) = 7.28, p < .001. In contrast, observers noted that the eyes of the 
stimulation face moved in a different direction to their own in incongruent displays, t(19) 
= 5.98, p < .001. However, when the ratings for items 10 (eyes moved in the same 
direction) and 11 (eyes moved in a different direction) are compared directly, it emerges 
that these are more similar in the incongruent condition, t(19) = 1.60, p = .12, than the 
congruent condition, t(19) ≥ 15.79, p < .001. This suggests that observers always 
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perceived movement of the stimulation faceÕs eyes, but were less sensitive to the 
direction of these movements in the incongruent condition. 
A comparison of the congruent and incongruent condition also shows that the 
gaze contingent paradigm did not affect observersÕ feelings about the onscreen face, 
which were comparable across these conditions in all enfacement questions (items 1-7), 
all ts(19) ≤ 1.65, ps >.07. An overall enfacement score, which was calculated by 
averaging across items 1 to 7 also shows that the congruent (M = 20.4, SD = 8.2) and 
incongruent (M = 17.9, SD = 9.1) conditions did not differ, t(19) = 1.14, p = .14. 
 
Discussion  
Experiment 1 explored whether it would be possible to update the internal 
representation of oneÕs own face with a gaze-contingent paradigm that simulates the 
mirror-reflection experience. This was investigated by comparing a congruent condition, 
in which the eye-gaze of an onscreen face follows that of the observer, with an 
incongruent condition, in which the gaze of the onscreen face was spatially incongruent. 
To assess whether this stimulation affected observersÕ self-representation, they were 
asked to detect their face in an image sequence that began with the onscreen face and 
gradually morphed into their own face. In comparison with a baseline measure, which 
was obtained prior to the administration of the stimulation task, a shift in self-
recognition was found in the congruent condition, whereby observers recognized their 
own face at an earlier stage of the morphing sequence. However, the same effect was 
also observed after the administration of the incongruent condition. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the gaze-congruent condition did not affect observersÕ self-
recognition per se. Instead, these findings hint at a practice effect whereby observers 
perceived their own face earlier in the morphing sequence of the congruent and 
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incongruent conditions in comparison to the initial baseline measure. In line with these 
findings, the results indicate also that the gaze-contingent paradigm did not affect how 
observers feel about the onscreen face and their own face. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that the difference in eye-gaze 
between the congruent and incongruent conditions was insufficient to elicit a mirror 
effect that can alter self-recognition. The verification items of the questionnaire reveal 
that observers were sensitive to the eye movements of the stimulation face in the 
congruent condition. However, this effect was considerably smaller with incongruent 
displays. Here, observers showed some false agreement that the stimulation face 
followed their eyes (see item 8 in Figure 3), and a direct comparison of items 10 and 11 
indicates limited insight into whether the onscreen gaze was moving in the same or a 
different direction to observersÕ own eyes.  
This situation might arise because eye-gaze direction cannot be perceived easily 
outside the focus of attention (Burton, Bindemann, Langton, Schweinberger, & Jenkins, 
2009; Hermens, Bindemann, & Burton, in press). In the current paradigm, observers 
have to explore the boxes surrounding the stimulation face to trigger its eye movements. 
As a result of this, however, this face is unattended when any changes in its gaze 
direction occur. If observers have limited awareness of these changes, then this might 
not produce the mirror-type effects that are required to affect self-recognition. To 
explore this possibility, we conducted a further experiment in which the incongruent 
condition was replaced with a neutral display, in which the eyes of the onscreen face 
looked straight ahead regardless of the observersÕ gaze behaviour. Such direct gaze is 
more salient than averted gaze outside the focus of attention (Yokoyama, Sakai, 
Noguchi, & Kita, 2014) and should therefore produce a stronger contrast to the 





In contrast to Experiment 1, which compared congruent gaze-contingent 
displays with an incongruent condition, this experiment compared congruent with 
neutral displays, in which the gaze of the onscreen face remained static and 
unresponsive. Based on previous research, we predicted that this condition should 
provide a stronger contrast to the moving eye-gaze of the congruent condition, 
particularly when the stimulation face is not attended (see Burton et al., 2009; Hermens 
et al., in press; Yokoyama, et al., 2014). If it is possible to update the representation of 
the own face using a gaze-contingent paradigm, then such an effect might now be 





Twenty new Caucasian students (10 female) from the University of Kent, with a 
mean age of 21 years (SD = 5.1), participated in this study. All provided informed 
consent prior to taking part, received course credits or a small fee for participation, and 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli and procedure  
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except that the 
incongruent condition was replaced with neutral gaze displays. In this condition, the 
eye-gaze of the onscreen was always directed straight at the observers and unresponsive. 
As in Experiment 1, the self-other discrimination task was administered initially to 
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obtain a baseline measure of self-recognition. Observers then performed two blocks, 
one for the congruent condition and one for the neutral condition, which comprised the 
stimulation phase, the self-other discrimination task, and the enfacement questionnaire. 
The order of these blocks was counterbalanced across observers. 
 
Results 
Self-other discrimination task 
Figure 4 illustrates performance in the self-other discrimination task for the 
baseline condition and after the administration of the congruent and neutral displays. A 
one-factor ANOVA (baseline, congruent, neutral condition) showed a main effect of 
condition, F(1,19) = 20.37, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .51. Paired sample t-tests (Bonferroni-
corrected) show that observers perceived their own face earlier in the morphing 
sequence after the application of both the congruent and neutral conditions in 
comparison with the baseline, t(19) = 6.68, p < .001 and t(19) = 4.51, p < .001, 
respectively. Discrimination performance in the congruent and neutral conditions did 
not differ, t(19) = 0.75, p = 1.00. 
 
Enfacement questionnaire 
ObserversÕ questionnaire responses are summarized in Figure 5. The difference 
in mean ratings for the verification items between the congruent and neutral condition 
demonstrates that observers were aware that the onscreen face followed their own eye-
gaze (see items 8-10 in Figure 5), all ts(19) ≥ 6.55, ps < .001. In addition, when asked 
whether the onscreen faceÕs eyes moved in a different direction to observersÕ own (item 




A comparison of the congruent and neutral condition also shows that the gaze-
contingent paradigm affected how observers felt about the stimulation face. Observers 
were more likely to report that this face looked like their own in the congruent than the 
neutral condition (items 1 and 2), both ts(19) ≥ 2.87, ps < .01, and also reported a closer 
resemblance between their own face and that of the onscreen face in the congruent than 
the neutral condition (items 5 and 6), both ts(19) ≥ 2.44, ps < .05. This effect was such 
that, if the eyes of the onscreen face had moved, they expected their own eyes to move 
too in the congruent condition (item 7), t(19) = 2.72, p < .05. However, an effect of 
condition was not universally found. Observers did not report that their own face felt 
out of control (item 4), t(19) = 0.19, p = .84, or, despite the clear convergence in felt 
resemblance between their own and the onscreen face, that they were looking at their 
own face in a mirror (item 3,) t(19) = 0.98, p = .33. 
Finally, an overall enfacement score was also calculated for each observer, by 
averaging across items 1 to 7. This enfacement score was higher in the congruent (M = 
22.8, SD = 10.6) than the neutral condition (M = 16.9, SD = 8.4), t(19) = 3.24, p < .01. 
 
Discussion 
This experiment investigated whether it is possible to update the representation 
of oneÕs own face with a gaze-contingent paradigm by comparing a congruent condition, 
in which the eye-gaze of an onscreen face followed that of the observer, with a neutral 
condition, in which the onscreen face was static and unresponsive. As in Experiment 1, 
observers were sensitive to the eye movements of the onscreen faces and their 
directionality in the congruent condition. However, a clearer contrast between 
conditions was now found, by replacing incongruent with neutral gaze displays (c.f., 
items 8-10 in Figures 3 and 5). Once again, however, this did not affect observersÕ self-
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recognition in the discrimination task, which revealed identical effects after congruent 
and neutral stimulation. 
Despite the absence of an effect on self-recognition in the visual discrimination 
task, the gaze-contingent paradigm affected observersÕ reports of how they felt about 
the onscreen and their own face. These reports revealed that observers felt that the 
onscreen face ÔwasÕ their own face and ÔbelongedÕ to them, and also that both faces 
began to resemble each other. This effect was such that, if the eyes of the onscreen face 
had moved, observers expected their own eyes to move too.  
These results indicate that this mirror-like gaze-contingent paradigm can affect 
how observers feel about their own faces. This finding converges with recent 
enfacement experiments, in which similar effects are found when observers view the 
tactile stimulation of another agent while their own face is also stimulated (e.g., Maister 
et al., 2013; Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a, 2012b; Tsakiris, 2008). However, in these 
studies a concurrent effect in the self-other discrimination task is typically also found 
(e.g., Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). 
A possible explanation for the absence of such an effect here might relate to the 
objects surrounding the onscreen face, which acted as trigger-regions to change its gaze-
direction and were required to elicit mirror-like responses. As a result of this 
manipulation, observers were actually drawn away from the onscreen face during 
stimulation. If this limits the encoding of the stimulation faces in our visual displays, by 
presenting these outside of foveal vision (see, e.g., Rousselet, Thorpe, & Fabre-Thorpe, 
2004; Rousselet, Husk, Bennett, & Sekuler, 2005), then this could limit the integration 
of the stimulation face into observersÕ self-representations. To explore this possibility, 
we conducted a third experiment in which the eight boxes surrounding the onscreen face 
were replaced with the same face. The aim of this manipulation was to maximize 
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In this experiment, we sought to maximise the encoding of the face identity in 
the stimulation task. As in the preceding experiments, an unfamiliar face was placed in 
the centre of the screen and responded to observerÕs eye-gaze. However, to increase the 
encoding of this identity, the eight surrounding boxes were replaced with copies of the 
same face. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, observers were therefore able to view the 
stimulation face directly, in the centre of the screen or one of the surrounding locations, 
throughout this task. These surrounding faces also responded to observerÕs eye-gaze by 
copying the actions of the central face. This manipulation overcomes the potential 
limitations of Experiment 1, in which eye-gaze direction could be perceived only from 
the unattended central face. In the current experiment, this allowed us to revert to 
incongruent gaze displays, in which the onscreen gaze moves in temporal synchrony but 
a different direction to observersÕ own eye-gaze. To introduce a task demand, one of the 
surrounding faces would close its eyes after the two-minute stimulation period and 
observers were asked to detect this change. If it is possible to update self-representations 
with this gaze-contingent paradigm, then such an effect should be more likely under 







Twenty new Caucasian students (17 female) from the University of Kent, with a 
mean age of 22 years (SD = 8.5), participated in this study. All provided informed 
consent prior to taking part, received course credits or a small fee for participation, and 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except for the 
following changes. In the stimulation task, the eight boxes surrounding the central face, 
and the objects within, were now replaced by copies of the stimulation face (see Figure 
6). Each of these peripheral faces measured 160 by 210 pixels at a resolution of 72 ppi. 
In the congruent condition, the central face and each of these peripheral copies mirror-
mimicked observersÕ eye-gaze direction. In the incongruent condition, the eye-gaze 
direction of the central face and the peripheral copies was spatially incongruent with 
observersÕ gaze. After a two-minute stimulation period, one of the surrounding faces 
closed it eyes. Observers were asked to scan the surrounding faces and to press the 
spacebar as soon as they detected this change. 
 
Results 
Self-other discrimination task 
Figure 7 summarizes performance in the self-other discrimination task for the 
baseline condition and after the administration of the congruent and incongruent 
stimulation displays. A one-factor ANOVA (baseline, congruent, incongruent) showed 
a main effect of condition, F(1,19) = 11.57, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .38. Paired sample t-tests 
(Bonferroni-corrected) show that observers perceived their own face earlier in the 
discrimination sequence in the congruent condition compared to the baseline, t(19) = 
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3.12, p < .05. However, a similar effect was observed in the incongruent condition, t(19) 
= 3.40, p < .05, and performance was indistinguishable when the congruent and 
incongruent conditions were compared directly, t(19) = 0.95, p = 1.00. 
 
Enfacement questionnaire 
The questionnaire responses indicate that observers were aware of the onscreen 
face following their own eye-gaze in the congruent compared to the incongruent 
condition (see items 8 and 9 in Figure 8), both ts(19) ≥ 2.19, ps < .05. Observers were 
also more likely to report that the targetÕs eyes moved in the same direction as their own 
in the congruent condition (item 10), t(19) = 7.13, p < .001, and in a different direction 
in the incongruent condition (item 11), t(19) = 6.66, p < .001. In addition, a direct 
comparison of the ratings for items 10 (eyes moved in the same direction) and 11 (eyes 
moved in a different direction) confirmed that observers discriminated the directionality 
of the onscreen eye movements in both the congruent, t(19) = 12.15, p < .001, and 
incongruent condition, t(19) = 3.10, p < .001. 
The gaze contingent paradigm also influenced how observers felt about the 
onscreen face. In the congruent compared to the incongruent condition, observers were 
more likely to report that the onscreen face looked like their own face (item 1), that it 
belonged to them (item 2), and that they felt they were looking at their own face in a 
mirror (item 3), all ts(19) ≥ 2.06, ps < .05. This effect was such that observers expected 
their own eyes to move too if the eyes of the target face had moved (item 7), t(19) = 
2.96, p < .01. 
However, an effect of condition was not universally found. Despite the clear 
convergence in felt resemblance between observersÕ own and the onscreen face, they 
did not report that these faces actually began to resemble each other (items 5 and 6), 
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both ts(19) ≤ 1.65, ps >.07. In addition, observers also did not report that their own face 
felt out of control (item 4), t(19) = .19, p = 1.67). Despite these similarities across 
conditions, observersÕ overall ratings, which combine items 1 to 7, also revealed a 
higher enfacement score in the congruent (M = 25.5, SD = 9.1) than the incongruent 
condition (M = 19.7, SD = 8.8), t(19) = 3.42, p < .01. 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, the objects surrounding the onscreen face during the 
stimulation phase were replaced with further images of this identity to maximize its 
encoding. In this context, observers were clearly sensitive to the onscreen faceÕs eye 
movements in the congruent and incongruent conditions. As in Experiment 2, the gaze-
contingent stimulation paradigm also influenced how observers felt about the onscreen 
face, such that they were more likely to report that the onscreen face looked like their 
own face and that it belonged to them in the congruent than in the incongruent condition. 
This effect was sufficiently strong for observers to be more likely to report that they felt 
as if they were looking at their own face in a mirror in the congruent condition, and that 
their own eyes might move to mimic the actions of the onscreen face. Despite this 
impact on observersÕ reports, the gaze-contingent task did not produce separable effects 
for the congruent and incongruent conditions in the perceptual self-other discrimination 
task. This converges with the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 to suggest that the gaze-
contingent paradigm does not influence observersÕ facial self-representations. 
 
General discussion 
In this paper, we have presented a new paradigm to study how human observers 
might update mental representations of their own face. This paradigm simulates the 
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mirror reflection experience by mimicking observersÕ eye-gaze behaviour with an 
onscreen face. In Experiment 1, observers were exposed to congruent stimulation, in 
which the movement of the onscreen face was synchronized with their own gaze 
behaviour, and an incongruent condition, in which the eyes of the onscreen face moved 
in a different direction to observersÕ eye-gaze. This experiment did not reveal an effect 
of gaze stimulation in the self-other discrimination task or on observersÕ subjective 
reports. The verification items of the questionnaire suggest that observers were sensitive 
to onscreen eye-gaze in the congruent condition. By contrast, however, observers did 
not report a clear directionality effect for the onscreen faceÕs eye movements in the 
incongruent condition. This suggests that they misperceived the direction of the 
onscreen faceÕs eye movements, which might have undermined any stimulation effects 
of the gaze-contingent task. 
Subsequent experiments explored whether the gaze-contingent paradigm can be 
modified to elicit such effects. Experiment 2 replaced the incongruent condition with 
neutral displays, in which the onscreen eye-gaze was static and unresponsive, to provide 
a stronger contrast with congruent displays (see Burton et al., 2009; Hermens et al., in 
press; Yokoyama et al., 2014). ObserversÕ self-reports showed that they were sensitive 
to the difference in the eye movements between conditions, and also the mimicry that 
these eye-movements exerted in the congruent condition. This was accompanied by a 
feeling that the onscreen face ÔwasÕ their own face and ÔbelongedÕ to them, and that both 
faces began to resemble each other. This effect was such that, if the eyes of the onscreen 
face had moved, observers would have expected their own eyes to move too. Once 
again, however, these changes were not accompanied by a corresponding effect in the 
self-other discrimination task, which indicates that the gaze-contingent task did not 
modify observersÕ perceptual representations of their own face. 
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It is possible that the encoding of the onscreen face was limited in these 
experiments because observers were drawn from its location to the peripheral object-
triggers during the stimulation phase. We therefore conducted a third experiment in 
which these peripheral objects were replaced with further photos of the onscreen face to 
promote further encoding of this identity. These additional face images also responded 
to observersÕ gaze in an attempt to further enhance this manipulation. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, observers were now clearly sensitive to gaze direction in both the 
congruent and incongruent condition. As in Experiment 2, this was accompanied by 
stronger reports in the congruent condition that the onscreen face was observersÕ own 
face than with incongruent displays, and that observers felt like they were looking at 
their own face in a mirror. Once again, however, the stimulation conditions did not 
affect the perceptual discrimination task. 
Taken together, these results indicate that our gaze-contingent mirror-experience 
paradigm can alter observersÕ subjective reports about their own face, by creating a ÔfeltÕ 
resemblance between their own face and an onscreen target. This effect is remarkable 
considering it followed a short stimulation period of only two minutes. At the same time, 
this stimulation was not effective in altering observersÕ perceptual self-representations, 
as measured with the self-other discrimination task. A possible explanation for these 
differences between observersÕ subjective reports and their perceptual performance 
could be that these reflect partially independent pathways in the cognitive face 
recognition system. One of these is responsible for the perceptual recognition of a face, 
whereas the other might provide an accompanying affective familiarity response, which 
can be expressed through changes in electrodermal activity (i.e., skin conductance 
responses, see Ellis & Young, 1990; Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). This idea derives 
from the study of Capgras delusion and prosopagnosia. In the former, observers can 
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identify familiar faces but do not exhibit the appropriate corresponding feelings of 
familiarity and related skin conductance responses. As a consequence, people with 
Capgras delusion believe that familiar persons have been replaced by impostors or 
aliens (Ellis, 1997). Prosopagnosic observers, on the other hand, are impaired in overt 
recognition but can still exhibit arousal responses to familiar faces (see, e.g., Ellis, 
Quayle, & Young, 1999). It is possible that our findings also tap into these dissociable 
processes, by manipulating affective evaluations of the own face but not perceptual 
representations. 
This idea receives some support from explorations of the enfacement effect, 
where visuotactile stimulation mediates arousal responses to target faces (e.g., Bufalari 
et al., 2014; Fini et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2013; Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & 
Schubert, 2010; Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a). These physiological changes are 
similar to skin conductance responses during familiar face recognition (Ellis, Young, & 
Koenken, 1993; Tranel & Damasio, 1985, 1988) and have been observed after 
synchronous, but not asynchronous, tactile stimulation with an unfamiliar face (see 
Tajadura-Jimnez et al., 2012a). However, in contrast to the current experiments, this 
enfacement effect is also accompanied by changes in the perceptual processing of faces. 
It remains unresolved why perceptual processing was not affected as well in the 
current experiments, but one possibility is that a stimulation phase of only two minutes 
is insufficient to manipulate self-representations that have been build-up over twenty 
years in our participants. This explanation would be consistent with theories of face 
recognition, such as average-based accounts, in which different instances of the same 
face are integrated into a single representation (Burton, et al., 2005). Such averages 
appear to be remarkably resistant to contamination by other identities. For example, 
changes to the average of a personÕs face appear to be imperceptible even when 20% of 
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the source images are photographs of the wrong person (Jenkins & Burton, 2011). If 
this approach corresponds to the cognitive system for face recognition, then one would 
also expect internal facial representations to be immune to the brief perceptual 
stimulation that is applied in the experiments here. 
In future studies, this could be explored further by extending the stimulation 
phase or by applying this paradigm to developmental populations, in which self-
representations have been established for fewer years and facial appearance is 
undergoing more pronounced age-related changes. Future studies could also examine 
whether the effect of mirror-feedback might be enhanced by mimicking more than 
observersÕ eye-gaze, such as facial expression and speech. By encompassing further 
facial information in this way, the mirror-mimicry may exert more direct effects on 
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TABLE 1. The enfacement questionnaire.  
 
Type of Item Enfacement Item 
Enfacement 1. I felt like the onscreen face was my face 
 2. I felt like the onscreen face belonged to me 
 3. I felt like I was looking at my own face reflected in a mirror 
 4. I felt like my own face was out of my control 
 5. I felt like my face began to resemble the onscreen face 
 6. I felt like the onscreen face began to resemble my face 
 7. I felt like if the onscreen faceÕs eyes had moved, my eyes would 
have moved too 
Verification 8. I felt like the onscreen faceÕs eyes followed my eyes 
 9. I felt like if I had moved my eyes, the onscreen faceÕs eyes 
would have moved too 
 10. The onscreen faceÕs eyes moved in the same direction as my 
eyes 






FIGURE 1. Example stimuli of the congruent condition for Experiment 1 and 2, 
showing direct eye-gaze (left panel) and the eyes pointing up (centre) or down (right). 
In the neutral condition, the eye-gaze remained direct and static throughout. In the 
incongruent condition, the eyes of the onscreen face pointed in a different direction to 







FIGURE 2. Performance in the self-other discrimination task in Experiment 1, 
expressed as the percentage of frames that observers judged to show their own face or 








FIGURE 3. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the congruent (black 
bars) and the incongruent (grey bars) conditions in Experiment 1. * p < .05; ** p < .01; 






FIGURE 4. Performance in the self-other discrimination task in Experiment 2, 
expressed as the percentage of frames that observers judged to show their own face or 







FIGURE 5. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the congruent (black 















FIGURE 7. Performance in the self-other discrimination task in Experiment 3, 
expressed as the percentage of frames that observers judged to show their own face or 







FIGURE 8. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the congruent (black 
bars) and incongruent (grey bars) conditions in Experiment 3. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** 
p <.001. 
 
 
 
 
